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The NCAA would like the American public to believe that only a few schools ever
break the rules, and it is never one of their golden programs. But other than making billions off of unpaid kids, has the NCAA ever made you confidently think
they know anything about anything?
Former college basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian 1
It almost seems impossible that, in the freest country in the world, we tolerated an
organization like the NCAA. Is it because we were indifferent, intimidated, uninformed, selfish, loyal to the system, left out, or didn’t know how to change a system
that has failed in its mission?
Former college basketball coach Dale Brown 2
If the NCAA and those who lead at the institutional and conference levels are unable to maintain academic values in the face of economics and related pressures,
the government may be less than a proverbial step away.
Law professor Rodney K. Smith 3

Formed one hundred years ago at the behest of President Theo4
dore Roosevelt, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
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2
Dale Brown, Foreword to DON YAEGER, UNDUE PROCESS: THE NCAA’S INJUSTICE
FOR ALL, at vi (1991).
3
Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role
in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 22 (2000).
4
See JAMES J. DUDERSTADT, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AND THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: A UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVE 70-71 (2003) (noting President Roosevelt’s concerns regarding the injuries suffered by college athletes, and his support for
“the principle of amateurism”); see also YAEGER, supra note 2, at 1-6 (describing how a
single on-field death-–one of eighteen suffered by college football players during the
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exists today “to govern competition in a fair, safe, equitable and
sportsmanlike manner, and to integrate intercollegiate athletics into
higher education so that the educational experience of the student5
athlete is paramount.” The NCAA is a private organization, made up
of over one thousand active member institutions—colleges and
universities representing widely divergent student bodies, educational
6
missions, and athletic budgets. Over the last three decades, due in
7
large part to the growing popularity of college sports on television,
the NCAA has become increasingly powerful, such that the degree to
which it now serves its own stated purpose regarding the “paramount”
8
nature of the educational experience may be seriously questioned.
Because of its private status, however, NCAA enforcement
proceedings are not governed by the kinds of constitutional
protections to which federal, state, and local governments must
adhere. No matter how ubiquitous the NCAA has become, and no
1905 season–-became a well-publicized spur toward rules reform, including the adoption of the forward pass).
5
NCAA, Our Mission, http://www2.ncaa.org/portal/about_ncaa/overview/
mission.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
6
See NCAA, Composition of the NCAA, http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/
membership_svcs/membership_breakdown.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2007) (noting
that, as of December 1, 2006, the total membership count was 1279 institutions, including conference and affiliated members). An estimated 384,742 student-athletes currently participate in NCAA-governed intercollegiate athletics. NCAA, Fact Sheet,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/fact_sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
7
See, e.g., Darren Rovell, Once an Afterthought, the Dance Is Now Big Business,
ESPN.COM, Oct. 10, 2005, http://proxy.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2186638&type=story
(noting that rights to telecast the NCAA Division I basketball tournament—now popularly known as “March Madness” or “The Big Dance”—that sold for less than $1.2 million in 1973, now bring in an average of $545 million per year to the NCAA, leading to
an increase in its operating budget from $21 million in 1989-1990 to $480 million in
2004-4-2005). See generally The NCAA and Conference Affiliation, in THE BUSINESS OF
SPORTS 459-67 (Scott R. Rosner & Kenneth L. Shropshire eds., 2004) (breaking down
recent NCAA budgets by sport, conference, source of revenue, and more). For further
information regarding the economic impact of the NCAA, see infra notes 139-141 and
accompanying text.
8
The threat of federal intervention in the operations of the NCAA has recently
become more salient. See, e.g., Pete Thamel, Brand Defends N.C.A.A. Tax Status, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at D4 (recounting NCAA President Myles Brand’s effort to defend the Association’s tax-exempt status in light of “corporate sponsorships, lucrative
TV deals and coaches with lavish contracts and no academic duties”); Editorial, College
Sports Get a Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2006, at A20 (commenting on a recent “toughminded letter” to the NCAA from the House Ways and Means Committee, seeking explanation of how athletic departments, some with budgets “growing two to three times
faster than higher education as a whole,” function on campuses across the country). It
is an open question whether the new Democratic majorities in Congress may prove
more demanding of explanations regarding the NCAA’s academic mission.
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matter how much is at stake in its rulings, in some ways the NCAA
remains untouchable by even the most basic requirements of fairness
that our legal system has embraced. This Comment asks whether, at
its most fundamental level, such an arrangement makes any sense. As
the opening quotations imply, the answer offered here is a resounding
“no.”
For a private organization like the NCAA to be bound by
Fourteenth Amendment standards of due process, the organization
9
must be deemed a “state actor” for constitutional purposes. While
the United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that the NCAA
10
does not qualify as a state actor, this Comment will argue that the
11
Court’s decision in NCAA v. Tarkanian warrants reevaluation, and
that there are a number of reasons why the NCAA should be held to
the same due process standards that apply to governmental
12
organizations.
Part I traces the history of state action doctrine, from its birth in
the post-Civil War era through its expansion under the Warren Court
and eventual retraction during the Burger/Rehnquist years. This is

9

See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
885-926 (15th ed. 2004) (delineating key moments in the evolution of “state action”
from 1883 to the present day).
10
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).
11
Because this Comment argues for an adjustment away from Supreme Court
precedent, issues of stare decisis must be acknowledged. However, as will become
clear throughout the Comment, the Court has employed so many different tests and
standards to assess state action that the doctrine itself has proven to be unusually pliable and fact dependent. The change I advocate is one of degree, not of kind, and it is
my contention that the Court could move further toward a flexible, case-by-case approach without necessarily overruling prior holdings.
12
While this Comment differs from previous work by explicitly calling for a revision of the doctrine expressed in Tarkanian in light of Brentwood Academy vs. Tennessee
Secondary School Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), legal scholarship has addressed the state
action question as it applies to athletic associations. See, e.g., Megan M. Cooper, Note,
Dusting Off the Old Play Book: How the Supreme Court Disregarded the Blum Trilogy, Returned to Theories of the Past, and Found State Action Through Entwinement in Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 913,
951-62 (2002) (tracing state action doctrine from Tarkanian through Brentwood); Lisa
Mastrogiovanni, Casenote, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 711, 728-40 (2002) (providing a close
reading of the majority and dissent in Brentwood); Robin Petronella, Comment, A
Comment on the Supreme Court’s Machiavellian Approach to Government Action and the Implications of Its Recent Decision in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 31 STETSON L. REV. 1057, 1072-81 (2002) (discussing Brentwood and
ultimately criticizing it as an overextension of the state action doctrine).
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13

not a well-settled area of the law, and at least two distinct notions of
how to determine what constitutes state action survive to the present
14
day. Part I further develops these dueling conceptions, examining
their underlying premises to identify the interests served by each. Part
II looks closely at two relatively recent Supreme Court decisions-–
15
NCAA v. Tarkanian and Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary
16
School Athletic Ass’n -–and argues that the line of reasoning adopted by
the Court with respect to a state high school association in Brentwood
should be applied to the NCAA’s behavior on the intercollegiate level,
and is therefore preferable to the reasoning employed in Tarkanian.
Part III concludes by advancing substantive justifications for holding a
private association like the NCAA to standards of fundamental
fairness.
I. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE THROUGH THE YEARS
A. A Restrictive Beginning
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides, in part, that “[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
17
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” This provision
18
came into play in the Civil Rights Cases, in which the Supreme Court
19
invalidated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 by expressly
13

See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the
state have not been a model of consistency.”); Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews,
Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional, 53 EMORY L.J. 1, 25 (2004) (“As modern state
action doctrine has made all too clear, exactly where the line between private and public is to be drawn is, at best, elusive.”).
14
See Martin A. Schwartz, New Issues Arising Under Section 1983, 18 TOURO L. REV.
641, 646 (2002) (describing two strands of state action jurisprudence—one structured
according to tests, the other more ad hoc in nature—the unpredictability of which
“puts litigators and lower court judges in a very difficult position”).
15
488 U.S. 179 (1988).
16
531 U.S. 288 (2001).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause adds that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” Id.
18
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
19
Ch. 14, 18 Stat. 335. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 had been passed, in part, to
provide equal access to public accommodations for newly freed slaves. “The [Civil
Rights Cases] grew out of exclusions of blacks from hotels, theaters and railroads.”
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holding Fourteenth Amendment protections to be valid only against
20
state actors. At its most basic level, the decision shielded admittedly
“wrongful” acts from due process and equal protection requirements,
so long as the acts were committed by private entities, not by an arm
of the government. The Court reached this decision over a stinging
dissent by Justice Harlan, who asserted, inter alia, that places of public
accommodation are state actors:
In every material sense applicable to the practical enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment, railroad corporations, keepers of inns, and
managers of places of public amusement are agents or instrumentalities
of the State, because they are charged with duties to the public, and are
amenable, in respect of their duties and functions, to governmental
21
regulation.

Despite Justice Harlan’s prescient argument, which was nearly a
century ahead of its time in terms of eventual Supreme Court rulings
22
regarding public accommodations, in the Civil Rights Cases the Court
adhered to a restrictive conception of state action. This was arguably
due at least in part to the immediate post-Civil War historical context,
in which issues of federalism were particularly salient. But while the
racial issues at the heart of the Reconstruction era found the Court
guarding against excessive federal involvement, in the twentieth
century racial discrimination would become a catalyst for the expansion
23
of state action doctrine.

SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 888.
20
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 17 (“[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed
by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts
of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial
or executive proceedings.”).
21
Id. at 58-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22
In the aftermath of the Court’s landmark school desegregation decision Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a series of cases eventually ruled that public
accommodations could not be divided along racial lines. See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia,
373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam) (observing in 1963 that it was “no longer open to
question that a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities”).
23
See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 892 (“Most of the [state action] cases
from the 1940s to the 1960s involved claims of racial discrimination (and most found
the 14th Amendment applicable).”).
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B. The Doctrine Expands
1. “Public Function” Analysis
24

In the so-called “White Primary Cases,” the Court prohibited
political parties, and states themselves, from limiting participation in
primary elections on the basis of race. While these cases more directly
implicated the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition on race
25
discrimination in the voting context, they extended Fourteenth
Amendment protections as well. This is especially true of state efforts
to delegate power to nongovernmental parties: after the White
Primary Cases, states could no longer achieve impermissibly
discriminatory goals simply by giving a private actor authority to
perform a public function that is governmental in nature. By invalidating
such efforts, the Court proved willing to extend Fourteenth
Amendment protections even when a strict, formalist approach might
have allowed for the opposite result. Subsequent cases have often
turned on the question of whether a given function in a particular
case was deemed to be “public” or “governmental.”
26
In Marsh v. Alabama, the Court followed the spirit of Justice
Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases by holding that the town of
Chickasaw, Alabama, which was owned by a shipping corporation,
could not prohibit a Jehovah’s Witness from distributing religious
literature, because that violated the First Amendment guarantee of
27
religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause. In extending the
28
public function prong within state action doctrine, the Court in
Marsh held that “[o]wnership does not always mean absolute
dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his

24

These cases include Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) (holding that
the Democratic Party’s exclusion of blacks from its primary constituted racial discrimination by the State of Texas); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944) (holding that
the power to determine qualifications for participation in elections is a state function
and that anyone who exercises it, though in the guise of a private party, is in reality an
agent of the state); and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953) (Clark, J., concurring)
(declaring that a private party may not control “the uncontested choice of public officials” without adhering to state action safeguards).
25
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 provides: “The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
26
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
27
Id. at 508. Under the Free Exercise Clause, “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
28
See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 894-901.
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property for use by the public in general, the more his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who
29
use it.”
In Marsh, the Court conceptualized town ownership as a
governmental function; this characterization brought First
Amendment rights into play, even though the town was owned by a
private corporation. This is the paradigm for public function analysis
of state action: private entities that act in ways and for purposes
typically associated with governmental functions are held to the same
constitutional standards as government entities themselves.
2. “State Nexus” Analysis
Two terms after Marsh, the Court further extended its concept of
30
state action in Shelley v. Kraemer, in which Chief Justice Vinson’s majority opinion held that, while it may not be unlawful for private indi31
viduals to enter into racially restrictive housing covenants, the State
may not enforce such covenants, because to do so would constitute state
32
action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While private
discrimination remained beyond the scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections, Shelley remade the dividing line between private and
public, so that a private agreement, though in and of itself permissible, could become unconstitutional when enforced if the agreement
in question relied sufficiently upon the government for its enforcement. That a state’s mere “involvement” in a private agreement
could, in some circumstances, lead to state action represented a broad
33
extension of the doctrine.
Because of Shelley’s far-reaching implications, scholars have suggested that the case cannot be read literally for precedential purposes,
and that it was probably decided in such broad terms because the par29

Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
31
“[The Fourteenth] Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct,
however discriminatory or wrongful.” Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
32
See id. at 19 (finding “no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in
the full and complete sense of the phrase” and that “but for the active intervention of
the state courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have
been free to occupy the properties in question without restraint”). Future Justice
Thurgood Marshall, who would become a committed expansionist in terms of state
action doctrine upon his ascendance to the Court, served as co-counsel for the petitioners in Shelley. Id. at 2.
33
See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 9, at 903 (“Some seemingly ‘neutral’ state
nexus with a private actor can almost always be found: at least by way of the usual state
law backdrop recognizing exercises of private choices.”).
30
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ticular practices in the cases before the Court were especially objec34
tionable. Nonetheless, Shelley represented a further example of the
Court expanding its conception of state action in order to combat discriminatory practices at the state level.
35
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority provided another such extension of the state action doctrine, this time at the local level. In Burton, a municipal parking garage in Wilmington, Delaware, leased
space to a restaurant. When that restaurant refused to serve AfricanAmerican patrons, a lawsuit was filed under the Equal Protection
36
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court of
Delaware held that the restaurant was acting in “a purely private ca37
pacity,” and was therefore insulated from equal protection requirements. But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that ruling, relying on
the symbiotic relationship between the city-owned garage and the discriminatory behavior of its lessee, the restaurant. Emphasizing the
need to look at “the peculiar facts or circumstances present” in each
case, the Court held that “when a State leases public property in the
manner and for the purpose shown to have been the case here, the
proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment must be complied with
by the lessee as certainly as though they were binding covenants writ38
ten into the agreement itself.”
Burton’s recognition that the precise boundaries of state action are
necessarily fact-specific determinations—the Court called the act of
defining those boundaries an “‘impossible task’ which ‘[t]his Court
39
has never attempted’” —marks it as perhaps the zenith of a progressive conception of state action. Here the Court took a close look at
the totality of the circumstances involved and determined that Fourteenth Amendment protection was appropriate, even though, as in
Shelley before, the connection between the discriminating party and
the state itself was arguably somewhat tenuous. With Burton, the

34

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 52729 (3d ed. 2006) (describing the breadth of Shelley’s logical implications, but noting
that “the Court only rarely has applied Shelley as a basis for finding state action”).
35
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
36
See id. at 716.
37
Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894, 902 (Del. 1960), rev’d, 365
U.S. 715 (1961).
38
Burton, 365 U.S. at 726.
39
Id. at 722 (quoting Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556
(1947)).
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Court extended the state action doctrine as far as it had ever gone be40
fore, and further than it has ventured since.
State nexus analysis in cases like Shelley and Burton provided the
mechanism for the Court to extend protection against racial discrimination, moving closer to the ideal for which the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in the first place. Historically speaking, these two
cases fit within the gradual, halting movement toward racial equality
that characterized much of American social and political life in the aftermath of World War II.
C. The Conservative Retrenchment
The end of Chief Justice Warren’s tenure marked an ideological
turning point for the Supreme Court on several fronts. President
Nixon’s appointment of Chief Justice Burger in 1969 and, especially,
of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in 1972, ushered in an era of backlash against some of the Warren Court’s more progressive holdings.
In the state action realm, cases like Shelley and Burton remained on the
books; however, the Court would soon begin to narrow its definition
of state action.
41
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, the Court declined to find state
action in the case of a private club’s racially discriminatory policy. In
rejecting the argument that the club’s state-granted liquor license was
sufficient to bind the private actors to Fourteenth Amendment standards of equal protection, Justice Rehnquist wrote for the 6-3 majority:
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise
private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or
if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since statefurnished services include such necessities of life as electricity, water, and
police and fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the
distinction between private as distinguished from state conduct set forth
42
in The Civil Rights Cases . . . and adhered to in subsequent decisions.

40

See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 251 (1985) (characterizing
Burton as “the high-water mark in a tide of state action doctrine that has since been almost constantly at ebb”).
41
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
42
Id. at 173. The majority in Moose Lodge included all four of President Nixon’s
new appointees, with Chief Justice Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Blackmun joining Justice Rehnquist’s opinion. Id. at 164.
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The opinion, which explicitly distinguished both Shelley and Burton, remains bound in spirit to the Reconstruction-era cases from
nearly a century before. The refusal to insist on precise criteria to define state action had allowed the more progressive Vinson and Warren
Courts to extend the doctrine, whether via public function or state
nexus analyses, as circumstances dictated. In Moose Lodge the Court
embraced a mirror-image approach, limiting the scope of state action
and ruling in a more restrictive manner. By reclaiming additional turf
on the “private” side of the public/private divide, Moose Lodge raised
the bar on the state nexus prong of state action doctrine: connections
between the private actor and the state would now have to be more
substantial in order for Fourteenth Amendment protections to apply.
While the landmark extensions of the previous decades may not have
been overturned, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts would prove
much more likely to absolve private actors from constitutional requirements. The fact-specific approach that previously led to an expansion of the state action doctrine was now being employed to rein it
in.
Justice Rehnquist, writing again for the same 6-3 majority as in
Moose Lodge, continued this process of distinguishing expansionist
precedents while embracing restrictive ones in Jackson v. Metropolitan
44
Edison Co.
As the above quote from Moose Lodge explicitly anticipated, the majority in Jackson found that a private supplier of electric45
ity was not a state actor. Rejecting the argument that, because electricity is an essential item, the termination of its service must meet due
process restrictions, Justice Rehnquist summarized the Court’s holding:
43

All of petitioner’s arguments taken together show no more than that
Metropolitan was a heavily regulated, privately owned utility, enjoying at
least a partial monopoly in the providing of electrical service within its
territory, and that it elected to terminate service to petitioner in a manner which the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission found permissible
under state law. Under our decision this is not sufficient to connect the
State of Pennsylvania with respondent’s action so as to make the latter’s
conduct attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
46
Amendment.

43
44
45
46

Id. at 172.
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
Id. at 358-59.
Id. at 358.
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Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued that the majority failed to take
a cumulative look at the facts, which pointed to “a monopolist providing essential public services as a licensee of the State and within a
47
framework of extensive state supervision and control.” Indeed, Jackson was arguably a case in which the private actions were “sufficiently
48
intertwined with those of the State” to an even greater degree than
in both Shelley and Burton. The state action doctrine was now being
reargued almost completely anew, with only cursory attention paid to
its development over the previous century; the Civil Rights Cases
seemed to provide the only precedent that the Burger Court was unwilling to distinguish. Justice Marshall’s Jackson dissent, which complained of the majority’s unwillingness to add together the various factors that might lead toward a finding of state action, would prove
prophetic: “Today the Court . . . adopts a stance that is bound to lead to
mischief when applied to problems beyond the narrow sphere of due
49
process objections to utility terminations.”
Whereas prior to Jackson the Court seemed to look at the totality
of circumstances in assessing whether state action should be imputed
in a given case, two decisions handed down on the same day in 1982
50
found the Court replicating its “sequential” Jackson-style analysis. In
51
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, the Court considered whether a private
school’s discharge of certain employees fell under the purview of
Fourteenth Amendment protections. Despite the facts that ninety
percent of the school’s operating budget came from the government,
the school was subject to extensive state regulation, and it served a
public function by educating maladjusted students, the Court ruled
that those discharged by the school were not entitled to constitutional
52
standards of due process.
In Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court followed a similar path, ruling that a
private nursing home’s transfer or discharge of Medicaid patients
53
“without notice or an opportunity for a hearing” —decisions that re-

47

Id. at 362 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id.
49
Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
50
See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The
Search for Governmental Responsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 405 (1997) (“The Jackson
Court’s approach to state nexus analysis was duplicated in the Court’s 1982 decisions
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn and Blum v. Yaretsky.” (footnotes omitted)).
51
457 U.S. 830 (1982).
52
Id. at 840-43.
53
457 U.S. 991, 993 (1982).
48
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duced the patients’ federal benefits—did not violate the Fourteenth
54
Amendment, either. Justice Brennan’s dissent in Blum accused the
majority of running afoul of Burton by “ignoring the nature of the
regulatory framework presented by this case in favor of the recitation
of abstract tests and a pigeonhole approach to the question of state
55
action.”
Cases like Shelley and Burton validate the idea that state action may
be found lurking behind things as seemingly private as housing covenants or restaurant management decisions; the acknowledgement or
discovery of government influence in such factual circumstances
evolves out of the Court’s flexible, cumulative approach, in which factors are combined to meet the threshold of state action. In contrast,
the cases from Moose Lodge forward increasingly require much more
overt state involvement, with the Court resolving ambiguities in favor
of private actors. “After the twin decisions in Blum and Rendell-Baker, if
56
the totality approach was not dead, it was at least gasping for breath.”
The ongoing debates regarding state action may be explained by
the fact that few legal doctrines engage the philosophical impulse as
fully as do questions of due process or equal protection. The Fourteenth Amendment was passed quickly on the heels of the lengthy and
destructive Civil War, and the breadth of the Amendment’s application continues to divide scholars and Justices. Perhaps, as one commentator has argued, the doctrine cuts even deeper:
The Fourteenth Amendment remains the great Rorschach test of one’s
underlying jurisprudential beliefs. For those of a “progressive” bent, the
amendment is a “sweeping mandate,” while those more inclined toward
powdered wigs and judicial formalism criticize the amendment as an instrument of “freewheeling [judicial] lawmaking.” . . . The result is not

54

Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1013-14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56
Buchanan, supra note 50, at 406. Interestingly, a third state action opinion was
also handed down on June 25, 1982. In that case, the Court did find state action, over
dissents by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, the respective authors of the
majority opinions in Rendell-Baker and Blum. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 942 (1982) (finding state action in the joint participation by state and private parties in an attachment proceeding mandated by state law). Justices White, Blackmun,
and Stevens, each of whom had declined to find state action in both Rendell-Baker and
Blum, found the facts of Lugar more persuasive, and they constituted the Lugar majority with Justices Brennan and Marshall. The Court’s posture in this era thus reflected
strong adherents on both sides of the debate (with Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist least likely to find state action and Justices Brennan and Marshall most
likely to find it), and a more pliable group of moderate Justices whose opinions were
somewhat more “in play” on a case-by-case basis.
55
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merely a meandering precedent of inconsistent verdicts, but a serious
epistemological quandary that leaves one to wonder what values are to
be assigned to “close nexus” and “entwinement,” and how future jurists
57
should apply such precedent.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has welcomed intercollegiate
and scholastic athletic associations into the state action thicket. Having traced the historical development of this contentious area through
the early 1980s, the balance of this Comment will address how the
doctrine has been applied in these athletic contexts, and will conclude
by suggesting a course for future application.
II. ATHLETIC ASSOCIATIONS AND STATE ACTION
A. Shark Hunting
1. Background and Procedural History
In the world of college sports, where the most prominent players
change every few years due to graduation, loss of eligibility, and professional opportunities, the real “stars” are usually the head coaches.
Particularly in basketball, where top coaches’ careers can provide
them with thirty or more years in the public spotlight, frequent media
attention, and increasingly lucrative salaries and endorsement deals,
58
in some ways the coaches define the sport.

57

Michael A. Culpepper, Casenote, A Matter of Normative Judgment: Brentwood and
the Emergence of the “Pervasive Entwinement” Test, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1163, 1163-64
(2002) (footnotes omitted).
58
This status, long implicitly understood by college basketball fans, has led to
some prominent coaches becoming national celebrities, as evidenced by the proliferation of “inspirational” books published by big-name coaches over the past few years.
Examples include Duke Coach Mike Krzyzewski (LEADING WITH THE HEART: COACH
K’S SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BASKETBALL, BUSINESS, AND LIFE (2001)); onetime
Kentucky and current Louisville coach Rick Pitino’s SUCCESS IS A CHOICE: TEN STEPS
TO OVERACHIEVING IN BUSINESS AND LIFE (1998); and Tarkanian’s own memoir, supra
note 1. The visibility of these and other top coaches has created a situation in which
the leader of a university’s basketball program is often the most visible public figure
representing that school, further amplifying the financial relevance of ensuring fairness in NCAA enforcement proceedings, which can potentially cripple an athletic program. The National Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC) exists to promote the
college game and the role of the coach within it. For information regarding the
NABC and its view of coaches as “Guardians of the Game,” see What Is the NABC and
What Does it Do, http://nabc.cstv.com/about/about-basicinfo.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2007).

1282

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 1269

Although he is now retired from coaching, Jerry Tarkanian (a.k.a.
“Tark the Shark”) was for many years one of the most recognizable
figures in college sports. After a successful career on the high school
and junior college levels, his teams won 778 Division I college games
(509 of them during his nineteen-year tenure at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas), reached four Final Fours, and won the 1990 NCAA
59
national championship.
Many of his players went on to great ac60
claim as professionals, and he was always well respected by his fellow
61
coaches, but throughout his career, Tarkanian’s unconventional appearance, idiosyncratic courtside behavior, and off-court issues did
even more to make him famous than did his coaching success.
By far the most prominent of these controversies was his lengthy
62
battle with the NCAA. It began in 1972, when Tarkanian was the
coach at Long Beach State University. Protesting what he considered
to be unfair selective prosecution of recruiting violations by the NCAA
enforcement group, Tarkanian wrote two newspaper columns in the
Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram accusing the NCAA of picking on
smaller schools while turning a blind eye to violations at prominent
63
programs, most notably the University of Kentucky.
59

See TARKANIAN WITH WETZEL, supra note 1, at xv, 221-22.
Players like Larry Johnson, Stacey Augmon, Greg Anthony, Sidney Green,
Armon Gilliam, and Reggie Theus each played ten or more seasons in the NBA
after playing for Tarkanian at UNLV. For a list of players who attended UNLV before
playing professionally in the United States, see NBA/ABA Players who Attended University
of
Nevada--Las
Vegas,
http://www.databasebasketball.com/players/
bycollege.htm?sch=University+of+Nevada+%2D+Las+Vegas (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
61
See, e.g., Bob Knight, Foreword to TARKANIAN WITH WETZEL, supra note 1, at ix
(“There is no one I have observed in my 40 years of coaching who has been able to do
a better job of [getting his players to play hard on the court] consistently than Jerry
Tarkanian.”).
62
See generally PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT,
CASES, PROBLEMS 742-43 (3d ed. 2004) (detailing Tarkanian’s conflicts with the
NCAA); YAEGER, supra note 2, at 195-248 (same).
63
See YAEGER, supra note 2, at 200 (quoting one of Tarkanian’s columns: “The
University of Kentucky basketball program breaks more rules in a day than Western
Kentucky does in a year. . . . The NCAA just doesn’t want to take on the big boys”).
The Kentucky program, long reputed to be among the “dirtiest” in the sport, was eventually placed on probation in the late 1980s following an episode in which an overnight envelope, sent by an assistant coach and addressed to prospective recruit Chris
Mills, inadvertently came open and revealed $1500 in cash, in clear violation of the
NCAA’s amateur guidelines. Tarkanian, who attempted to recruit Mills to play for him
at UNLV, contends that schools like Kentucky (the program that has won the most
games in college basketball history) and UCLA (which has won the most national
championships) got away with many such recruiting violations over several decades,
while less-prominent colleges-–including those at which he coached-–were targeted by
NCAA enforcement. TARKANIAN WITH WETZEL, supra note 1, at 147-49; see also John P.
60
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When Tarkanian left Long Beach to become the head coach at
the University of Nevada--Las Vegas in 1973, the NCAA was already in64
vestigating the UNLV program.
This investigation, which culminated three years later, eventually led to charges that the school had
committed thirty-eight different rules violations, ten of which named
65
Tarkanian. When, in 1977, the University and Tarkanian appealed,
66
the NCAA Council upheld the Infractions Committee’s findings.
The NCAA placed UNLV on probation for two years and also made an
unprecedented move, ordering the University to suspend its coach for
67
two years or face additional penalties. Nevada law required UNLV-–
a state institution—to hold a hearing prior to suspending the coach,
but “[a]lthough the hearing officer did not believe that any violations
had occurred, he concluded that UNLV had no choice but to suspend
68
Tarkanian if the school wanted to remain part of the NCAA.”
Before he could be suspended, Tarkanian sued the university in
Nevada state court, alleging that he had been deprived of property
and liberty without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth

Sahl, College Athletes and Due Process Protection: What’s Left After National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988)?, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 621,
621 n.1 (providing details on the Kentucky case).
64
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 742. The investigation, which had been
inactive before Tarkanian took the UNLV job, was reopened within a week of his arrival on the UNLV campus. The first entry into the investigatory file was a newspaper
clip reporting Tarkanian’s new job. YAEGER, supra note 2, at 201.
65
See YAEGER, supra note 2, at 201 (providing details regarding the NCAA’s Official Letter of Inquiry and hearings conducted by its Committee on Infractions). Yaeger’s book goes into exhaustive detail about the NCAA’s investigatory policies, which
he continually characterizes as being unfair and vindictive. Looking closely at the specifics of the NCAA procedures, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. For
present purposes, it is enough to stipulate that the NCAA’s procedures fall well short
of constitutional standards of due process, a claim that no one would be likely to deny.
See infra notes 67 & 89 (discussing the inadequacies of the NCAA’s procedures).
66
YAEGER, supra note 2, at 202.
67
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 743. The main charges against Tarkanian
were that he paid for a player’s flight home, that he arranged for a player’s grade to be
changed to maintain his on-court eligibility, and that he had pressured witnesses to
give false statements to investigators. Id. at 742-43. The evidence presented against
Tarkanian consisted entirely of hearsay testimony by NCAA investigators. Id. at 743.
No oral examination or cross-examination of witnesses was allowed, and the NCAA enforcement staff was granted a private consultation with the Council in between the
presentation of evidence and the rendering of the verdict. Id.; see also Tarkanian v.
NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Nev. 1987) (discussing the inadequacy of the NCAA’s adjudicatory practices, including its reliance on investigators’ mere oral recollections of
source interviews and the interviewees’ inability to check the accuracy of the evidentiary memoranda).
68
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 743 (emphasis added).
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69

Amendment. After the trial court enjoined the suspension, UNLV
appealed; the NCAA was subsequently joined as a party, at its own re70
quest.
Tarkanian then filed an amended complaint, adding the
NCAA as a defendant. After four years of delays, during which Tarkanian remained the active head coach at UNLV, he won a bench
trial. The court found that the NCAA’s conduct qualified as state ac71
tion and that its decision had been arbitrary and capricious. After
Tarkanian filed a petition to recover attorney’s fees and the NCAA
was ordered to pay ninety percent of the $196,000 due him, the NCAA
appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court; UNLV did not join in that
72
appeal.
The Nevada Supreme Court also found that the NCAA qualified
as a state actor, at least insofar as the suspension of Tarkanian was
73
concerned. In doing so, it relied in large part on the fact that “many
NCAA member institutions were either public or government sup74
ported,” and that, because the right to discipline a public employee
“is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state,” UNLV could
75
not delegate that duty to a private entity. Upon the NCAA’s appeal,
the case finally reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988, some fifteen
years after the initial NCAA investigation of UNLV had commenced.
2. The Coach at the Highest Court
Justice Stevens authored the Court’s 5-4 majority opinion, which
reversed the Nevada Supreme Court and held that the NCAA did not
76
function as a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. The
majority’s analysis declined to follow the liberal precedents established most broadly in Shelley and Burton, and instead continued along
the much more restrictive lines of Moose Lodge, Jackson, and their more
recent progeny. In doing so, the Court rejected Tarkanian’s claims
one by one, unwilling to consolidate the various elements of his case
against the NCAA into a single, cumulatively powerful argument.

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1346.
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 188 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 189.
Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1349.
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 199 (1988).
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Tarkanian claimed that UNLV, clearly a state actor, created a cooperative arrangement with the NCAA by delegating to the Association exclusive authority to discipline UNLV’s coach. Since the NCAA
was now a joint actor with the state university, on this theory, the
NCAA enforcement proceedings became state action. This seemed to
77
be a strong argument; in fact, even Jackson’s restrictive test could arguably be met on the facts presented. But, far from finding a “close
nexus” between the NCAA and UNLV, the Court held that Tarkanian’s joint action claim “fundamentally misconstrue[d] the facts of
78
this case.” The Court was convinced that UNLV had acted under
color of state law. But while the NCAA’s behavior was clearly influential in determining how the university would act, it was the school itself, not the national association, that suspended Tarkanian. Therefore, the majority argued, “the question is not whether UNLV
participated to a critical extent in the NCAA’s activities, but whether
UNLV’s actions in compliance with the NCAA rules and recommen79
dations turned the NCAA’s conduct into state action.” By focusing
on the technical fact that the NCAA had no direct power to discipline
Tarkanian, the Court effectively minimized the obvious truth that
UNLV was largely bound by economic necessity to follow the NCAA’s
80
“recommendations” of punishment.
The Court also relied upon the fact that the NCAA, as a national
association, was composed of institutions from many different states.
For the majority, the fact that almost all of those schools were located
outside Nevada, and that NCAA rules, propagated by its collective
membership, were therefore independent of any one state, made Tarkanian’s claim that the NCAA was acting under color of Nevada law a
81
nonstarter.
77

“[T]he inquiry must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter
may fairly be treated as that of the State itself.” Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351 (1974).
78
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192.
79
Id. at 193.
80
Because the NCAA is composed of member institutions, not individuals, its authority does not explicitly extend to “ordering” suspensions of coaches. As the Tarkanian fact pattern shows, however, the NCAA does wield a great deal of coercive
power over its member schools. For a discussion of the financial stakes involved, see
THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 7; Rovell, supra note 7. Of course, further motivation to keep Tarkanian on the sidelines came from the kinds of visibility issues addressed in note 58, supra.
81
See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194 (“‘Whatever de facto authority the [private standard-setting] Association enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any
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Refusing to recognize the substantive reasons that led the university to discipline its coach, despite his success and an investigation by
the school that revealed no wrongdoing, the Court made this argument regarding the dilemma UNLV faced:
UNLV retained the authority to withdraw from the NCAA and establish
its own standards. The university alternatively could have stayed in the
Association and worked through the Association’s legislative process to
amend rules or standards it deemed harsh, unfair, or unwieldy. Neither
UNLV’s decision to adopt the NCAA’s standards nor its minor role in
their formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the NCAA
was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated standards
82
governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic performance.

This analysis bespeaks the Court’s adherence to rigid tests for determining whether a private party may be held to be a state actor. “By
strictly concentrating on determining if UNLV’s suspension of Tarkanian was under color of Nevada law or under NCAA rules for purposes of state action, the Court necessarily trivialized the substantial
claims advanced by Tarkanian that he was unfairly deprived of fun83
damental interests.” Most importantly, by abandoning consideration
of the human interests at stake in favor of a strict analysis of the degree to which the Nevada government was involved, the Court violated
the spirit of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, which has generally provided guarantees of due process and equal protection rights
84
for U.S. citizens.
The Court insisted that UNLV had a real choice in whether to follow the NCAA’s punishment recommendations, and it held that the
school never delegated to the NCAA any power to discipline its
85
coach. Both of these points may be factually correct, but neither reflects the substantive context within which the school found itself.
NCAA investigations and enforcement proceedings were the only reasons why Tarkanian was in any trouble at all with UNLV, and the university’s financial health depended on maintaining NCAA membership. When push came to shove, the NCAA had all of the power. The
government . . . [.]’” (quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486
U.S. 492, 501 (1988) (alterations in original))).
82
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 194-4-95 (footnote omitted).
83
Sahl, supra note 63, at 654.
84
See id. (arguing that, had the Court paid more attention to “the alleged interest[s] at stake,” it could have lowered the risk that “basic values of human dignity, such
as notice and a fair hearing, [would be] abused”).
85
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195-96 (“UNLV delegated no power to the NCAA to take
specific action against any university employee.”).
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Court’s reluctance to deal with these realities makes its opinion entirely dependent upon formalistic criteria.
“[M]ost experts [agree] that there is no viable alternative to the
86
NCAA for successfully marketing athletic programs.” That was true
in 1977, when UNLV faced the prospect of increased sanctions if it
failed to show cause why Tarkanian should not be suspended; it was
true in 1988, when the Court ruled in favor of the NCAA in this case;
and it is even more clearly true in 2007, given the financial explosion
87
in college basketball during the last two decades.
The only real awareness of this substantive context was visible between the lines of the majority opinion. Justice Stevens’s opinion argues that not only were UNLV and the NCAA not joint actors in the
suspension, but they “acted much more like adversaries than like
88
partners engaged in a dispassionate search for the truth.” That opinion assumes, of course, that the NCAA proceeding was in fact a legitimate attempt to uncover “the truth” in the first place. Given that
UNLV did conduct its own internal investigation into the charges leveled against the basketball program, and especially given the degree
to which NCAA procedures fail to meet the kinds of due process stan89
dards that Fourteenth Amendment protections would have required,
the Court seems to have placed the university in an untenable position: If UNLV cooperates with the NCAA and suspends its coach, the
school is implicitly consenting to the Association’s practices, many of
which UNLV might otherwise find lacking. If, on the other hand, the
school challenges the validity of the NCAA’s findings, then UNLV in
effect places itself on probation, having already ceded its disciplinary
authority to the NCAA. In a sense, the real loser in this case is the
university. At least Tarkanian himself had his day in court—indeed,
86

Sahl, supra note 63, at 623.
For a discussion of the NCAA’s financial growth in recent years, see supra
note 7.
88
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196.
89
Tarkanian alleged, inter alia, the following due process infirmities: the Committee on Infractions failing to “inform Tarkanian of its practices and procedures and misleading Tarkanian about an adversarial hearing so that he was unrepresented at the
hearing” and “rel[ying] on the unsworn recollections of an NCAA investigator as truthful and consider[ing] all evidence to the contrary as untruthful without standards or
guidelines regarding the burden of proof”; an NCAA Committee member “decid[ing]
that Tarkanian was wrong before the actual hearing”; and “the NCAA secretly tap[ing]
their conversations with Tarkanian or UNLV representatives in violation of state laws.”
Sahl, supra note 63, at 654 n.205 (citing 2 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW
AND BUSINESS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES: COMMON ISSUES IN AMATEUR AND PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 80-81 (1986)).
87
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he had several. While it is certainly true that a school may have a conflict of interest in finding its own coach or program innocent of rules
infractions, one would think that fact should lead the Court toward requiring constitutional standards of due process, not away from it.
The dissent in Tarkanian, written by Justice White and joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor, simply found the NCAA to
90
be a state actor because it acted jointly with UNLV in the suspension.
Justice White’s dissent offers three main reasons why this “joint action” should be sufficient to bring the NCAA under constitutional due
process guidelines. “First, Tarkanian was suspended for violations of
NCAA rules, which UNLV embraced in its agreement with the
91
NCAA.” In other words, the NCAA set up the rules, and the alleged
breaking of those rules was the sole reason for the coach’s suspension.
“Second, the NCAA and UNLV also agreed that the NCAA would
92
conduct the hearings concerning violations of its rules.”
The dissenters clearly recognized that UNLV had, in fact, delegated some degree of authority to the NCAA enforcement proceedings. “Third, the
NCAA and UNLV agreed that the findings of fact made by the NCAA
93
at the hearings it conducted would be binding on UNLV.” Not only
did the Association dictate the procedures to be employed, but the
school agreed to be bound by them, with no right of appeal; that is,
UNLV agreed “to accept the NCAA’s findings of fact as in some way
94
superior to [the school’s] own.” These three elements, added together, convinced the four dissenters that Tarkanian deserved the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections.
From the Tarkanian dissent, one can see how, if a Court were inclined to favor precedent like Burton, UNLV could have been deemed
95
a state actor under state nexus analysis. In the alternative, an application of public function analysis, grounded in an understanding of
how completely UNLV, a state actor, delegated its authority to the
96
“private” NCAA, could have also yielded a victory for Tarkanian.

90

Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 203 (White, J., dissenting). Both the majority and dissent
agreed that UNLV was itself a state actor. “A state university without question is a state
actor.” Id. at 192.
91
Id. at 200 (White, J., dissenting).
92
Id. at 201.
93
Id.
94
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
95
See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text (discussing state nexus analysis).
96
For a discussion of public function analysis and delegation of authority, see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
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However, because of the “meandering precedent of inconsistent ver97
dicts” that has plagued state action doctrine, the Court was free to
choose its own precedential authority from among various strains,
some of which are seemingly incompatible with one another.
B. Post-Tarkanian Developments
1. State Inaction
In the immediate aftermath of the Tarkanian decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court further refined its position regarding state action in
one especially poignant case. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Court declined to find state action in the
98
case of a boy who was severely beaten by his custodial father. Although county social workers were aware of persistent child abuse,
they took no action to secure the boy’s safety; eventually he suffered
99
permanent brain injuries. The boy, along with his mother (who had
not been living with her son during the abuse), sued the county and
its Department of Social Services for depriving him of his liberty with100
out due process.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
found that, despite the tragedy of the case, the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment was designed “to protect the people from
the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each
101
other.”
Rejecting the majority’s approach, Justice Brennan in dissent asserted that the state’s affirmative intervention into the boy’s life
through a child-protection program created a duty to protect him,
and that Shelley and Burton “suggest[ed] that a State may be found
complicit in an injury even if it did not create the situation that caused
102
the harm.”
More pointedly, Justice Blackmun’s separate dissent re103
buked the Court for its “sterile formalism” and compared its approach—claiming that its hands were tied by settled law—to that of

97

Culpepper, supra note 57, at 1164.
489 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1989).
99
Id. at 193.
100
Id. at 191, 193.
101
Id. at 196.
102
Id. at 207 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98
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“the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves.”
Blackmun’s chief complaint was the Court’s attempt

104

Justice

to draw a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction. But such
formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the broad and
stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . On the contrary, the
question presented by this case is an open one, and our Fourteenth
Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depend105
ing upon how one chooses to read them.

Implicitly acknowledging that the decision to follow precedent is
rarely value neutral, Justice Blackmun’s dissent in DeShaney contrasts
sharply with the formalistic approach to state action that the Court favored throughout the Rehnquist era. Justice Blackmun’s approach is
unusual for its frank admission that, at least in the state action realm,
stare decisis does not always dictate a result. To acknowledge that
members of the Court may, in fact, choose to interpret a doctrine
broadly or narrowly runs counter to the ideal of a limited judiciary,
and exposes Justice Blackmun to charges of “judicial activism.” But no
matter how one feels about such ideological critiques, Justice Blackmun’s DeShaney dissent is refreshing for its candor, and it should be
applauded by any who favor flexibility over formalism on the Court.
However, Justice Blackmun would soon leave the Court, as would
the pair of stalwart progressive Justices, Brennan and Marshall. By the
middle of the 1990s, nearly half of the Tarkanian Court had retired,
and while the newer Justices did not always cater to progressive ideals,
the Court’s turnover in personnel did leave state action doctrine
somewhat open for reevaluation.
2. “Entwinement”: An Expansionist Return?
In Brentwood Academy v. Tenneseee Secondary School Ass’n, the Court
moved away from the restrictive analysis that had been so dominant
for three decades when it held that the Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association (TSSAA), an organization of member schools that
regulates high school sports within that state, was indeed a “state ac106
tor.”
Justice Souter’s majority opinion took the “close nexus” test

104

Id.
Id. at 212-13.
106
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 305
(2001). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari again in Brentwood, but not on
the state action issue; this time the Court will address the merits of the constitutional
claims. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 852 (2007).
105
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107

used in Jackson as an invitation to make a “normative judgment”
108
where “the criteria lack rigid simplicity.” Adding to the multitude of
tests it has employed in state action cases, the Court in Brentwood held
“that the association’s regulatory activity may and should be treated as
state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in the structure of the association,” in part because there was “no
109
offsetting reason to see the association’s acts in any other way.”
The standard employed in Brentwood, then, clearly marks two
changes from the Court’s previous state action decisions. First, it recognizes, as did Justice Blackmun’s DeShaney dissent, that the act of
judging is sometimes more art than science. That the regulatory activity “may and should be treated as state action” sounds much different
from the blindly formalistic pronouncements of the more restrictive
cases, wherein questions were generally answered “yes” or “no,” with
little gray area left open for discussion. Second, by explicitly balancing different sides of an issue, the Brentwood standard allows substantive concerns to play a role in the adjudication of state action questions. To speak of “no offsetting reason” to see things another way
strongly implies that some other fact pattern may present such a reason. This flexibility alone distinguishes Brentwood from most of its
contemporary state action predecessors. The key point, and the reason why Brentwood may signal a reevaluation of state action as it applies
to the NCAA, is that “Justice Souter took the conception and test of
the state action doctrine decidedly back in the direction of the intuitive, ad hoc doctrine of the pre-Rehnquist Vinson and Warren
110
Courts.”
As with Tarkanian, the dispute in Brentwood began with allegations
of illegal recruiting of athletes. The football coach at Brentwood
Academy, a private Christian high school in a Nashville suburb, was
accused of violating TSSAA rules by, among other things, inviting
promising eighth graders to visit a practice and giving some students
111
free tickets to Brentwood games.
After finding that the school’s actions violated recruiting rules, the TSSAA placed Brentwood on four
years’ athletic probation, banned its football and basketball teams
107

See supra note 77 (explaining the nexus test).
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295.
109
Id. at 291.
110
Alan R. Madry, Statewide School Athletic Associations and Constitutional Liability;
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 12 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 365, 391 (2001).
111
WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 62, at 753-54.
108
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from the playoffs for two years, and fined the school $3,000.
Brentwood then sued the TSSAA in federal court, alleging that enforcement of the recruiting rules was state action and in violation of the
113
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Brentwood prevailed on a motion for summary judgment, with the district court ironically relying
on a footnote from Tarkanian suggesting that statewide interscholastic
114
athletic associations actually were state actors. On appeal, the TSSAA
won a reversal, with the Sixth Circuit holding that the district court
had erred in finding a symbiotic relationship between the State and
115
the Association.
Justice Souter’s majority opinion surveyed the various factors that
the Court had at times found dispositive in assessing the existence of
state action, noting that previous cases had
identified a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution. We have, for example, held that a challenged activity may be state
action when it results from the State’s exercise of “coercive power,” when
the State provides “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,” or
when a private actor operates as a “willful participant in joint activity with
the State or its agents.” We have treated a nominally private entity as a
state actor when it is controlled by an “agency of the State,” when it has
been delegated a public function by the State, when it is “entwined with
governmental policies,” or when government is “entwined in [its] man116
agement or control.”

Having summarized the history of state action doctrine, the Brentwood majority then declined to force the facts of the case into a prefabricated portal. Instead, Justice Souter’s opinion bespeaks a commitment to substantive evaluation on a case-by-case basis, a method far
removed from the judicial formalism to which the Court had rather
faithfully adhered up through Tarkanian and DeShaney. In fact, in

112

Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 293.
Id.
114
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670,
682 (M.D. Tenn. 1998). The Tarkanian footnote reads, in pertinent part: “The situation would, of course, be different if the membership consisted entirely of institutions
located within the same State, many of them public institutions created by the same
sovereign.” NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 n.13 (1988). This formal difference
seems to have provided Justice Stevens with a reason sufficient to find state action in
Brentwood, in which he joined the majority opinion, as distinct from Tarkanian. Because both cases found the Court mired in 5-4 splits, in a limited sense the Brentwood
decision actually does rest on formalist grounds.
115
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766
(6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
116
Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296 (citations omitted).
113
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Brentwood the Court seems to weigh factors and decide that the TSSAA
should be treated as a state actor, for the most part, simply because
there’s no reason not to do so: “The nominally private character of
the Association is overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public
institutions and public officials in its composition and workings, and
there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in applying constitutional
117
standards to it.”
Rather than err on the side of the private actor via some formalistic approach based on precise definitions, Justice Souter applies due
process safeguards almost as a default, since there seems to be no reason why doing so would be unfair, given the entwinement of public
and private in the case. In place of the predictable but inflexible doctrine advanced by Justice Rehnquist from Moose Lodge through DeShaney, the Brentwood Court endorses a method of analysis in which
the facts of the case itself play a larger role in its outcome. From the
perspective advanced herein, this is obviously a welcome change.
Justice Thomas wrote the dissent in Brentwood, in which Chief Jus118
tice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined.
Unsurprisingly, given the history of the debate on the state action issue, the dissent focused on the need for less flexible criteria. Justice Thomas
opined in the first paragraph that the Court had “never found state
119
action based upon mere ‘entwinement,’” and in the last paragraph
120
complained that “the scope of [the] holding is unclear.” In a direct
response to Justice Thomas’s complaints, Justice Souter articulated
the perspective shared by those past jurists who had favored a more
flexible approach to state action by arguing that “if formalism were
the sine qua non of state action, the doctrine would vanish owing to the
ease and inevitability of its evasion, and for just that reason formalism
121
has never been controlling.”
The most interesting aspect of the Thomas dissent is buried in a
footnote. However, like the footnote in Tarkanian’s majority opinion
that was later used by the district court in Brentwood, Thomas’s footnote could also point to future developments in state action doctrine,
though probably not in a direction of his choosing. Justice Thomas
found Justice Souter’s state action criteria to be so broad that it actu-

117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
Id. at 305-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 305.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 301 n.4 (Souter, J.).
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ally called the viability of Tarkanian into question: “[I]t is not difficult
to imagine that application of the majority’s entwinement test could
change the result reached in [Tarkanian], so that the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s actions could be found to be state action
given its large number of public institution members that virtually
122
control the organization.”
That prospect, unwarranted as it may be
from Justice Thomas’s perspective, will be addressed, and indeed advocated, in the next Section of this Comment.
III. WHERE SHOULD THE COURT GO FROM HERE?
A. An Adaptive Analytical Model
The most basic conflict between the conservative, formalistic approach and the more progressive, fact-based approach to state action
revolves around how much one values legal predictability as compared
with flexibility. A bright-line doctrinal approach will always lead to
more certainty in the law, but, like the powerful but plodding sevenfoot center who appears lost when drawn out away from the basket by
a quicker opponent, the formalist cannot easily adjust to “game” circumstances. By contrast, the Brentwood approach promises to be more
adaptable, albeit at the cost of some doctrinal certainty.
College athletics has now become so financially relevant, and important in so many ways to the lives of students, coaches, administrators, alumni booster organizations, and legions of fans that a more
adaptive doctrine is required. Therefore, the Supreme Court should
look afresh at the NCAA, and do so in light of the Brentwood approach.
123
It should be remembered that this approach is not “new;” it is just
from a different precedential line than the one followed by most recent Court decisions. Overly formalistic conceptions of state action
have essentially given the NCAA a free pass to operate in a selfregulated environment when it comes to its enforcement proceedings,
and the Association’s track record reveals an inability to function fairly
in such a context. Granted, the prospects for the progressive move
advocated here may be dim in the short term, particularly if Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito maintain their generally

122

Id. at 314 n.7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
“[I]n accepting background involvement to be sufficient for finding state action, Brentwood Academy seems more of a piece with [Burton] . . . than recent state action decisions.” Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367,
1415 n.166 (2003).
123
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conservative judicial philosophies during their tenures on the Supreme Court. However, there is much at stake in the state action
question that should be conceptualized in politically neutral ways.
One should also remember that, once confirmed, Supreme Court Justices do not inevitably follow the anticipated ideological lines for
124
which they were presumably appointed.
Even if conservative ideology does dominate the Court in the coming years, leading to a more restrictive state action doctrine, there is
no logical reason why the NCAA deserves a “bye” when it comes to
due process and equal protection. Indeed, recent events have demonstrated more than ever that a hard-line “law and order” approach to
enforcing rules on the collegiate level should point first toward reform of the NCAA.
For examples one need look no further than two recent, wellpublicized cases. One involved the former head basketball coach at
Baylor University who, in an effort to deflect attention away from his
own misdeeds, attempted to cover up one of his players’ criminal responsibility for the murder of a former teammate by fabricating a
125
story that painted the deceased student-athlete as a drug dealer.
The other is a longtime controversy regarding the former head
women’s basketball coach at Penn State University, who is alleged to
126
have imposed a de facto ban on lesbian players on her team.
Obvi124

The most recent example of this phenomenon would be Justice Souter, whose
decisions on the Court have disappointed most conservatives. Other examples include
Justice Stevens (generally among the more liberal voices on the current Court), Justice
Blackmun (author of many conservatives’ least favorite opinion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973)), and, paradigmatically, Chief Justice Warren (under whose leadership the
Court extended civil rights legislation to unprecedented levels between 1953 and
1969). Each of these four men joined the Court as Republicans, having been appointed by Republican Presidents.
125
Barry Horn, How a Career Unraveled: NCAA Report Reveals Depth of Bliss’ Efforts to
Cover Up Violations, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 24, 2005, at 1C. Coach Dave Bliss
resigned in disgrace. The NCAA responded by punishing the Baylor players who remained, canceling the team’s nonconference schedule and placing the program on
five years’ probation. See also Matt Fulks, Beyond the Stats: A Long Way from Baylor to Bismarck,
KCMETROSPORTS.COM, http://kcmetrosports.com/articles/article.asp?aid=2702&full=-1 (last
visited Mar. 23, 2007) (criticizing the NCAA for its response to the problems at
Baylor). Following his ignominious exit from Baylor, Bliss briefly coached professionally in the minor league Continental Basketball Association, resigning after one losing
season as the head coach of the Dakota Wizards. W.H. Stickney, Jr. & Brian
McTaggart, Around Sports, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 23, 2006, at 2.
126
Coach Rene Portland was recently sued in federal court for alleged discrimination against a former player based on that player’s sexual orientation. Press Release,
Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, National Center for Lesbian Rights Files Federal Discrimination Lawsuit on Behalf of Former Penn State Basketball Star Jennifer Harris:
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ously, most cases of misconduct in and around college sports do not
reach this level of seriousness, but when even a single player endures a
127
lengthy procedure in which he is ruled ineligible, or when a coach
128
is dismissed for allegedly making improper payments to a recruit,
the consequences are serious enough to insist on a fair and open forum for adjudication.
If these and countless other recent examples mean anything at all,
they point to the need for a stronger governing body. But, for the
NCAA to function effectively, it must be fair. In order to increase the
public perception of fairness-–thereby legitimizing the Association’s
role in these matters-–and to engender confidence in the thousands
of athletes and coaches who fill stadiums and generate millions of dol-

Complaint Names Coach Rene Portland, Athletic Director Tim Curley, and Penn State
as Defendants (Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.clubs.psu.edu/up/
psupride/articles/Federal%20Lawsuit%20Press%20Release%2012212005.pdf. In the
wake of a university investigation conducted after the suit was filed, Portland was fined
$10,000, threatened with dismissal should further violations occur, and instructed to
undergo “diversity and inclusiveness” training. The lawsuit was settled in early 2007,
and Portland resigned her position soon thereafter. Penn State’s Portland Makes “Difficult” Decision to Quit, ESPN.COM, Mar. 22, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncw/news/story?id=2808075. Although Portland’s animosity toward lesbian players
has been public knowledge at least since 1986, id., and despite Penn State’s eventual
reprimand, the NCAA never disciplined her or her school’s program in any way.
127
For example, Kentucky freshman center Randolph Morris accepted expense
money from NBA teams when it appeared he would be leaving college basketball, but
then he went undrafted in the 2005 NBA player draft. When Morris applied to reenter school, initially he was ruled permanently ineligible to play basketball. Then he
was ushered through a number of appeals processes, and again ruled ineligible. Finally, he was allowed to play after missing the first fourteen games of the 2005-2006
season. NCAA Reduces Morris’ Suspension to 14 Games, ESPN.COM, Dec. 15, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2260113&type=story.
In contrast, the
NCAA acted very quickly-–in a matter of days-–when a violation occurred involving
USC’s Heisman Trophy-winning quarterback Matt Leinart and an unauthorized ESPN
promotional advertisement. NCAA Reinstates Leinart After ‘Inadvertent’ Violation,
ESPN.COM, Dec. 21, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2267624&type=story.
Such discrepancies raise questions about why some NCAA investigations drag on for
years while other disputes are resolved so quickly. Of course the stigma of being publicly “under investigation” is punishment in itself.
128
For example, Ohio State University fired head basketball coach Jim O’Brien in
2004 when school officials discovered that he had lent $6,000 to a potential recruit.
Although O’Brien had a clause in his contract ensuring that he could not be fired for
rules infractions absent an NCAA ruling, Ohio State dismissed the coach without any
findings from the NCAA. O’Brien Denies He Gave Ohio State Grounds for Firing,
ESPN.COM, Dec. 14, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2259096&type=story.
Still awaiting an NCAA ruling, O’Brien sued Ohio State and was awarded $2.4 million
in damages. Ohio State Appeals $2.4 Million Award to O’Brien, ESPN.COM, Sept. 16, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2590492&type=story.
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lars in revenue for its member schools and conferences, the NCAA
should be held to due process and equal protection standards.
B. Balancing Uniformity with Diversity
The NCAA is a peculiar blend of diverse institutions, and in many
ways this diversity is responsible for the strength and popularity of intercollegiate sports. However, if fair competition is to remain a possibility, at some level the member schools must abide by a uniform set
of guidelines. How should the desire for fair competition be balanced
against both the rights of each institution to police itself and the
benefits and protections provided to the student-athletes and
coaches? This is a major dilemma facing intercollegiate sports; how
one feels about Tarkanian and similar cases depends in part on where
one thinks that line between collectivity and autonomy ought to be
drawn.
NCAA bylaws mandate minimum academic standards for students
129
to maintain athletic eligibility, and all member schools must comply.
But many schools and conferences go well beyond the minimum
standards, meaning, in effect, that schools content with meeting only
the minimum requirements may have a significant competitive advantage when it comes to some academically weak prospects. Conversely,
certain schools that have higher academic reputations (Duke and
Stanford being preeminent among them in the basketball world)
probably win some recruiting battles because of the perception that
such schools will better prepare those players who do not make the
NBA for alternative careers in their adult lives. These kinds of differences among institutions seem unobjectionable. Unless we want to
foster a system that drastically circumscribes the boundaries within
which academic institutions are allowed to prioritize athletics, it seems
that the current system is sufficient as to academic standards.
But what of the ways in which schools police their own athletes
and coaches? A wide variation in approaches to dealing with internal
disciplinary matters may be found at the highest levels of intercollegiate sports. For example, the men’s basketball programs at the University of North Carolina and the University of Connecticut have a
great deal in common. They are both led by iconic coaches, they each
draw upon a tradition of excellence on the court, and they have each

129

NCAA, Eligibilty, http://www.ncaa.org (follow “Academics & Athletes” hyperlink; then follow “Student-Athlete Eligibility” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
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recently won multiple NCAA basketball championships.
The
schools part ways, however, when it comes to their responses to recent
legal troubles surrounding their programs.
In the spring of 2004, high school senior and prospective North
Carolina recruit JamesOn Curry-–who had, more than a year earlier,
accepted a scholarship to play for his home-state Tar Heels-–became
the leading high school scorer in the rich basketball history of that
state. However, when he was later arrested as part of a local sting operation and charged with selling a small amount of marijuana (a
charge that Curry later admitted was true), North Carolina head
131
coach Roy Williams revoked Curry’s scholarship offer.
Curry’s legal
troubles meant that he would never be allowed to enroll at the school
of his choice, even though he had been promised a full scholarship to
attend.
Curry later matriculated at Oklahoma State University, a school
that had never recruited him before his legal troubles began, but
where he excelled as a freshman on a prominent, nationally ranked
132
team.
Owing to the presence of four other stars who would each
soon leave college early to become wealthy professional players, North
Carolina was able to win the national championship in 2005 even
133
without Curry. So, perhaps it was not a great sacrifice for the talentrich Tar Heels to take a hard line in Curry’s case. However, if he had
been a member of their team in the following season, he would have
been one of the best players on an inexperienced roster. The decision to revoke his scholarship thus does have a lasting impact for the
North Carolina program, to say nothing of the program at Oklahoma
State. More importantly, one wonders whether the same decision to
revoke the scholarship would have been made by a different coach, at
a different school, in a different context. If not, should the NCAA
strive to mandate a uniform policy in such cases, or is this scenario
better handled within the confines of each member school?

130

Connecticut won championships in 1999 and 2004; North Carolina won titles
in 1993 and 2005. NCAASports.com, History—Past Champions, http://ncaasports.com/
basketball/mens/history/divi (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
131
See Thayer Evans, Cowboys’ Curry Makes Most of Second Chance, WASH. POST, Mar.
15, 2005, at D7 (quoting Curry on North Carolina: “Carolina is a great university. . . .
They did what they had to do. I respect them for that. It’s a decision they had to
make.”).
132
Id.
133
Keith Parsons, Twenty-nine Years Later, May Matches his Father’s Title,
http://www.ncaasports.com/basketball/mens/gamecenter/recap/NCAAB_20050404_NC@IL
(last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
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During the summer of 2005, two Connecticut players were arrested for stealing laptop computers from a dormitory on campus.
They each admitted to the offense. One of them, junior point guard
Marcus Williams, was among the top backcourt players in the nation,
with a near-certain future in the NBA. Connecticut coach Jim Calhoun responded to Williams’s offense with a half-year suspension,
forcing the star player to miss eleven games at the start of the season,
a period during which Connecticut went undefeated while playing a
relatively weak nonconference schedule. Williams then returned to a
134
starting role for the Huskies, who later advanced to the “Elite Eight”
of the NCAA Tournament.
Calhoun’s relatively lenient treatment of Marcus Williams contrasts with his full-year suspension of the other player involved with
the theft, freshman A.J. Price. Privacy issues regarding the two players’ involvement in the crime make it difficult to assess their relative
culpability, but the disparate punishment raises questions regarding
the school’s treatment of student-athletes. If Price had been a veteran
player, would he have received as harsh a punishment? Or, if a less
prominent member of the team had been involved, would he, like
Williams, have been allowed to keep his scholarship? Again, is this an
area where the need to maintain fair standards of competition among
member schools warrants NCAA involvement?
These two cases are by no means identical, but both North Carolina and Connecticut are public universities (and therefore state actors), both annually recruit the finest high school prospects in the
country, and both produce more than their share of professional stars.
Their responses to these legal issues also represent the kind of institutional variance in punishment that makes for the appearance of competitive imbalance. Is this an area in which institutional diversity
should be allowed to govern, or does the NCAA need to enforce some
kind of uniformity when it comes to disciplining athletes with criminal
backgrounds? To what degree is it fair to insist on a level playing field
among competitors?

134

See Gregg Doyel, Huskies Take Risk, Williams Brings Results, CBS
SPORTSLINE.COM, Jan. 22, 2006, http://www.cbs.sportsline.com/collegebasketball/
story/9180364 (calling Coach Calhoun “the most powerful man in Connecticut” and
saying that Williams’s renewed eligibility “was worth every bit of political capital Calhoun could muster”). Williams has since entered the NBA, having been drafted in the
first round by the New Jersey Nets. NBA.com, Nets Sign First-Round Picks Williams
and Boone, http://www.nba.com/nets/news/netswilliamsboone_060712.html (last
visited Mar. 23, 2007).
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These questions have no easy answers. On the one hand, conflictof-interest concerns are obviously present whenever a school is allowed the final word on its own athletes’ punishments. On the other,
many schools would likely withdraw from a national association before
allowing it to interfere too much in admissions and other eligibility
determinations. Even if such issues fall outside the appropriate realm
for national uniformity, and even if broad policies regarding membership in the NCAA may not have direct constitutional implications, the
complexity of these and other questions points toward the need for
more procedural safeguards to protect the rights of all concerned.
However one feels about these issues, there are surely limits to the
value of this type of diversity among schools. There must be some
point at which we need to compare apples with apples, instead of trying to impose the same guidelines on institutions or sports that do not
actually have that much in common.
These issues have drawn the attention of Jay Bilas, a national
commentator on college basketball who is also an attorney. Bilas argues that “[t]he NCAA needs to have ‘sport-specific’ rules that make
135
practical sense for each specific sport.”
He argues, for example,
that it is “patently absurd to have the same rules apply to a field
136
hockey player that apply to a basketball player.” He advocates drawing the line between sports based on purely economic differences in
revenue generation, a change that would further isolate football and
137
men’s basketball from other intercollegiate sports.
How much do
football and men’s basketball dominate in terms of revenue generation at the major college level? The University of Michigan’s athletic
program generated $44.2 million during the 1997-1998 academic
138
year; among Big Ten universities, ninety-five percent of the total
139
athletic department revenue came from those two sports alone.
135

Jay Bilas, Good Guards, Bad Shooting and Worse Rules, ESPN.COM, Dec. 17, 2005
(on file with author). Bilas graduated from Duke University School of Law after playing collegiate basketball as an undergraduate there; he now balances a law practice
with a seasonal job analyzing college basketball for ESPN. See Moore & Van Allen, Attorney Profile of Jay S. Bilas, http://www.mvalaw.com/AttDetails.php?id=19 (last visited Mar. 23, 2007). Bilas’s article offers a number of other useful perspectives regarding NCAA enforcement proceedings, the use of scholarship reductions as punishment
for rules violations, and the accountability of coaches.
136
Bilas, supra note 135.
137
Id. Regarding the revenue generation of college basketball, see the discussion
supra note 7.
138
DUDERSTADT, supra note 4, at 136 tbl.1.
139
Id. at 138. The NCAA is not directly involved in the bowl system governing bigtime college football; consequently, the great majority of its operating budget depends
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This Comment has dealt with only a select few of the issues facing
intercollegiate athletics, but there is no shortage of instances in which
the NCAA becomes involved in legal battles. For example, a recent
class action lawsuit filed on behalf of some 20,000 former studentathletes has challenged the NCAA’s scholarship standards, seeking “to
prohibit the NCAA from telling member colleges they cannot offer
140
athletic scholarships up to the full cost of attendance.”
The suit accuses the NCAA of collusion amounting to $117 million in damages,
an amount that could be trebled under antitrust law to $351 million
141
should the NCAA lose the case.
While this suit may not turn on the
state action question directly, it, like Tarkanian, obviously does raise
issues regarding the NCAA’s ability to dictate policy to its member institutions. If this or a similar lawsuit challenging the NCAA’s authority
were to reach high enough, the Supreme Court may well seize another opportunity to define the NCAA in relation to basic constitutional standards. If and when that happens, it will be interesting to
see whether Tarkanian is treated as controlling precedent, or if Brentwood signaled a sea change in the Court’s state action doctrine.
C. Back to the Future?
Clearly, the NCAA has plenty of work to do, and as intercollegiate
athletics continues to grow in popularity and profitability, the Association will undoubtedly face new challenges. However, none of its initiatives, no matter how necessary and well meaning, will garner significant public support unless the Association itself is perceived to be
fair. Ultimately, nothing could do more to help the NCAA, and intercollegiate sports in general, than to require the Association to meet
Fourteenth Amendment procedural guidelines. Despite the doctrinal
confusion in the area, the NCAA should be considered a state actor.

on men’s basketball. For example, of the $422 million NCAA budget for 2002-2003,
nearly eighty-eight percent ($370 million) came from the Association’s new 11-year,
$6.2 billion deal with CBS for rights to televise the men’s basketball tournament. THE
BUSINESS OF SPORTS, supra note 7, at 459.
140
Tom Farrey, NCAA Might Face Damages in Hundreds of Millions, ESPN.COM, Feb.
21, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2337810&type=story.
Unlike
other students who receive scholarships, student-athletes are not permitted to receive
any funds for “incidentals such as phone bills and travel expenses,” due to NCAA regulations. Id. The lawsuit, White v. NCAA, was filed on February 17, 2006, in federal
court in Los Angeles. Id.
141
Id. The complaint filed in White v. NCAA in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California is available at http://www.voluntarytrade.org/
downloads/6P09_Complaint.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2007).
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Thankfully, a legal paradigm for this doctrine already exists. It
comes from a different era, before college sports became quite such
big business. In the mid-1970s, before the Supreme Court first considered the issue in Tarkanian, federal circuit courts twice ruled that
the NCAA was a state actor. In 1975, the Fifth Circuit held in Parish v.
NCAA that “by taking upon itself the role of coordinator and overseer
of college athletics—in the interest both of the individual student and
of the institution he attends—[the NCAA] is performing a traditional
142
governmental function.”
The court went even further, arguing that
the Association was so public that “were the NCAA to disappear to143
morrow, government would soon step in to fill the void.”
If the
public function prong of state action doctrine is to have any teeth at
all, it is hard to see how any private organization could be required to
meet a higher standard than that one. Moreover, if the NCAA’s public relevance was anywhere near that level in 1975, it is surely much
more so today.
Later that same year, in Howard University v. NCAA, the D.C. Circuit cited both the expansive Burton and the restrictive Jackson rulings
144
as controlling precedent.
The court ruled that the NCAA and its
member schools “are joined in a mutually beneficial relationship, and
in fact may be fairly said to form the type of symbiotic relationship between public and private entities which triggers constitutional scru145
tiny.”
Interestingly, the circuit courts in both Parish and Howard foresaw
the kind of circumstance that would come before the Supreme Court
in Tarkanian. Speaking to the delegation issue, the courts argued that
“it would be strange doctrine indeed to hold that the states could
avoid the restrictions placed upon them by the Constitution by banding together to form . . . a ‘private’ organization to which they have
146
relinquished some portion of their governmental power.”
The perspectives advanced in these pre-Tarkanian opinions should
be resuscitated by the Supreme Court today. It is time for college athletes and their coaches to be protected from overzealous enforcement

142

506 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 1033.
144
510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
145
Id. at 220. The court also characterized the NCAA as being “impregnated with
a governmental character.” Id.
146
Id. (quoting Parish, 506 F.2d at 1033). For further discussion of Howard, Parish,
and other issues related to the NCAA and state action in the 1970s, see Sahl, supra note
63, at 640-45.
143
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procedures that, while they may be well intentioned, too often run
afoul of basic fairness. It is also time for the NCAA to renew itself in
the public eye. A demonstrably above-board enforcement process
would go a long way toward rehabilitating the Association’s poor public image, and would in turn bolster confidence in the legitimacy of
147
intercollegiate sports in general.
CONCLUSION
Whether the Court’s analysis is to be based on public function,
state nexus, pervasive entwinement, or any combination of tests, the
NCAA operates in such a way that warrants it being treated as a state
actor for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. As this Comment has argued, the NCAA functions as a quasi-governmental body. The member institutions—many of them public and therefore unquestionably
state actors themselves—delegate a large degree of authority to the
private NCAA. Its member schools are virtually forced to comply with
NCAA rulings, as the option of leaving the Association is practically
out of the question. The potential for abuse is clear, and the mechanistic reasoning of Tarkanian, which is unduly permissive toward
NCAA procedures, should not be followed.
Brentwood’s emphasis on fact-specific determinations instead of
rigid, formalistic rules provides a template for how the Court could
define the status of the NCAA. Though it concerns an association of a
different kind, Brentwood-style jurisprudence could easily be applied to
a Tarkanian-type case. To do so would benefit all concerned, by protecting coaches and athletes from discriminatory or otherwise unfair
enforcement proceedings and by restoring credibility to the NCAA itself. Too many important issues exist within the NCAA’s purview, and
too much is riding on their fair disposition, for anything less than
constitutional protections to apply.
Justice delayed is better than nothing, and in 1998 Jerry Tarkanian
148
finally settled his claims against the NCAA for $2.5 million. By then,
he had outlasted most of the investigators who had worked so hard to

147

In any event, the NCAA’s “enthusiasm for fighting corruption in college sports
is partly driven by the fear of federal intervention.” College Sports Get a Warning, supra
note 8, at A20. Were such federal intervention (and its consequent “entanglement”)
to occur, the NCAA would probably be much more likely to be considered a state actor.
148
TARKANIAN WITH WETZEL, supra note 1, at 204.
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end his career. Bringing an end to the long conflict, NCAA President
Cedric Dempsey issued a statement reading, in part:
The NCAA regrets the 26-year ongoing dispute with Jerry Tarkanian and
looks forward to putting this matter to rest. Obviously, Jerry Tarkanian
has proven himself to be an excellent college basketball coach, and we
wish him and his family continued success for the remainder of his career. We know that this dispute has caused distress for all concerned.
We sincerely hope that by resolving this conflict, wounds can begin to
149
heal.

The agreement left Tarkanian feeling like a winner, but also dis150
appointed that the settlement received little media coverage.
He
eventually retired in 2002.
In November 2005, the coach returned to Las Vegas to be honored by UNLV at a special dedication ceremony. The Rebels’ home
floor at the Thomas & Mack Center will henceforth be known as
151
“Jerry Tarkanian Court.”
Given the percentage of his career that
was spent tied up in litigation, one wonders how many of those present to honor the retired coach on that night truly grasped the doubly
appropriate nature of that phrase.

149

Id.
Tarkanian writes in his memoir:
To me this was total vindication. It couldn’t have gone better. . . . The NCAA
investigated us for seven years, and they didn’t come up with one single major
violation. Not one. After all that time. They had to pay me $2.5 million.
They had to admit they were wrong. The president of the NCAA had to issue
that statement. And it barely got any attention at all.
150

Id.
151

UNLV Dedicates Jerry Tarkanian Court, ESPN.COM,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2237913&type=story.
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